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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces event-driven network control, a net-
work control framework that makes networks easier to man-
age by automating many tasks that must currently be per-
formed by manually modifying low-level, distributed, and
complex device configuration. We identify four policy do-
mains that inherently capture many events: time, user, his-
tory, and traffic flow. We then present Lithium, an event-
driven network control framework that can implement poli-
cies expressed using these domains. Lithium can support
policies that automatically react to a wide range of events,
from fluctuations in traffic volumes to changes in the time of
day. Lithium allows network operators to specify network-
wide policies in terms of a high-level, event-driven policy
model, as opposed to configuring individual network devices
with low-level commands. To show that Lithium is practical,
general, and applicable in different types of network scenar-
ios, we have deployed Lithium in both a campus network and
a home network and used it to implement more flexible and
dynamic network policies. We also perform evaluations to
show that Lithium introduces negligible overhead beyond a
conventional OpenFlow-based control framework.
1. Introduction
Network management is incredibly difficult and remains
one of the most important unsolved problems in commu-
nications networks; this problem is becoming increasingly
acute as networks become bigger and more complex. Net-
work management potentially entails implementing a variety
of policies and actions, ranging from provisioning network
topologies to implementing traffic load balance and access
control. Unfortunately, despite the increasing variety and
complexity of network management tasks, the mechanisms
for configuring and managing networks remain frustratingly
primitive: to perform even simple tasks, operators must grap-
ple with low-level configuration of individual devices, as
well as complicated network-wide dependencies. Manual
configuration is complex and error-prone [3, 14, 23, 24, 26].
Network operators cope with the continual transformation
of network states caused by various events ranging from in-
trusions to excessive data usage to network congestion by ei-
ther manually reconfiguring individual network devices or re-
lying on unwieldy collections of scripts. Different modules,
set of devices and scripts are responsible of solving different
dynamics of the network, making it harder to maintain the
network in a manageable state. The problem is exacerbated
by the fact that current configuration languages are low-level
do not accommodate frequent changes.
We posit that the complexity of network management
stems from the following two shortcomings of the current
configuration model:
• Network conditions are dynamic. The state of the net-
work is continually changing due to a variety of net-
work events. Hence, network configuration is continu-
ally in flux [22].
• Configuration languages are low-level and distributed.
The languages that network operators use for configur-
ing network devices are rudimentary. A network de-
vice’s configuration can have hundreds to thousands
of device-specific configuration lines that poorly repre-
sent the intended policy or high-level intended behav-
ior [4, 8, 12].
One approach to coping with the difficulty of network con-
figuration is to design tools that automate and check existing
network configurations [14, 16, 25]. Despite the significant
amount of previous work in this area, however, testing net-
work configurations remains extremely difficult. Another ap-
proach is to devise a higher-level language that could make
network management and configuration significantly easier
and less prone to errors. Although recent developments in
network programming languages based on functional reac-
tive programming show promise [17, 21], these languages
still typically operate on a packet level, rather than on the
level of higher-level policies. Raising the level of abstraction
requires developing a control model that can incorporate and
process more sophisticated, high-level events.
This paper describes the design, implementation, and de-
ployment of Lithium, a new event-driven network control
runtime that supports more realistic network policies. Unlike
existing paradigms for network configuration, Lithium natu-
rally handles changes to network conditions that arise due to
temporal conditions and changes in network state. Themodel
supports reactive constructs, which may ultimately enable a
wider classes of applications to be programmed in a high-
level declarative language. Lithium allows packet processing
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rules to change over time and in reaction to internal or exter-
nal network events.
Network operators can use Lithium to enforce policies that
are written as event-driven programs, using the state ma-
chine model and event listener built in the Lithium controller.
Through these components, it is possible to specify a com-
plex network policy in a simple, high-level declarative man-
ner, which normally requires intensive planning and use of
variety of scripts to achieve the same goal if current config-
uration methods based on low-level language is used, as we
later demonstrated in Section 5.
Software-defined networking separates the “data plane”
(i.e., the devices that forward packets) from the “control
plane” (i.e., the logic that makes decisions about how traf-
fic should be forwarded). Lithium draws inspiration from a
large body of previous work on software defined network-
ing, including Ethane [6], RCP [15], 4D [19], and propos-
als in the IETF FORCES working group [11]. This decou-
pling makes it possible for a network’s forwarding behavior
to be dictated by a single, logically centralized software con-
trol program, rather than complex, low-level network con-
figurations. However, the central question in software de-
fined networking—how should network control be specified
at the controller—remains as an unanswered question of ut-
most importance. For example, OpenFlow, which is one of
protocols built upon this paradigm, provides the environment
to control forwarding of traffic based on the incoming flow.
However, OpenFlow does not specify how software defined
networking could simplify network management, nor does
it incorporate control mechanisms for processing dynamic
network events. Lithium is a software defined networking
framework that supports a richer set of policies than conven-
tional OpenFlow-based control, which only operates on flow
characteristics.
We deployed Lithium in two unique settings to demon-
strate the power and flexibility of its constructs. First,
we used Lithium to re-implement a network access control
framework (which is currently implemented with a compli-
cated VLAN-based configuration) across three buildings on
the campus; the deployment has five switches, about thirty
active network ports, and a wireless network. Our research
group uses the deployment for general network access. We
also deployed Lithium in a home network to address an in-
teresting management problem in such networks: usage cap
management. Using Lithium’s configuration model, we were
able to easily set up network policies for home networks
that dynamically react to meaningful network events such
as monthly data usage capacity reached. Our deployment
and evaluation show that Lithium can simplify configura-
tion management for real-world configuration scenarios in
campus and enterprise network settings as well as in solving
home network management problems.
This paper presents three contributions. First, we intro-
duce the concept of event-driven network control and iden-














Figure 1: Comparing Lithium to existing approaches. The
legacy approach to network configuration uses a variety of
protocols from multiple layers to convert high-level network
policy to a set of configuration files. SDN advocates a cen-
tralized control with a software program, but is still limited to
flow-action pairs. Lithium uses a much richer set of control
domains.
work policies: time, history, user, and flow. Second, we de-
sign and Lithium, a new event-driven control framework that
can support policies that incorporate these domains. Third, to
demonstrate that Lithium can simplify network management
tasks in different types of networks, we deploy Lithium in an
enterprise network and a home network, two real-world set-
tings where network configuration is challenging today. We
evaluate Lithium in both of these settings to show that it is
both usable and feasible.
2. Lithium: Event-Driven Network Control
Although the research community has seen numerous calls
for developing higher-level network configuration languages,
few such high-level languages have emerged. The lack of
a higher-level language is not for lack of trying; rather,
we believe that the underlying network “runtime” remains
too complicated to directly support higher-level program-
ming domains. Software defined networking advocates net-
work control from a centralized software program, creating
the possibility for a range of improvements for expressing
higher-level network policies. Although OpenFlow is one
mode for central control, specifying actions based only on
properties of traffic flows inherently limits the expressive-
ness of network policies. Lithium attempts to fill this gap
by allowing operators to use additional event-driven control
domains for more declarative and expressive network poli-
cies. Figure 1 shows how Lithium extends the control model
that current software-defined networking systems provide.
2.1 Event-Driven Control Domains
Domains for expressing event-driven control. Table 1
shows possible domains along with example policies where
each condition might be useful. The first three rows are ex-
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domains Examples
Time peak traffic hours, academic semester start date
History
amount of data usage, traffic rate, traffic delay, loss
rate
User
identity of the user, assignment to distinct policy
group
Flow
ingress port, ether src, ether dst, ether type, vlan id,
vlan priority, IP src, IP dst, IP dst, IP ToS bits, src
port, dst port
Table 1: Control domains, and examples of how a higher-
level policy might use them. First three rows are event-
driven control domains, meaning these domains can invoke
an event, which in turn can change the network state. In con-
trast, flow is not a event-driven control domain.
amples of event-driven control domains; the last row, flow,
is not. Flow is a 12-tuple control domain that already exists
in the OpenFlow specification: action is determined for the
incoming packet based on the flow domain specification. For
the purposes of this paper, we consider only the set of ac-
tions permitted by OpenFlow (e.g., forward, drop, redirect);
instead, we focus on how the network might support a richer
set of conditions on which to perform action on a certain traf-
fic flow. We focus on four domains for which the controller
might take different actions:
• Time. Network operators often need to implement poli-
cies where network behavior depends on the date or
time of day. For example, a campus network would
want to manage traffic differently in semester breaks
when traffic loads are less than they are during the
academic year; similarly, operators may want to rate-
limit non-essential traffic during peak hours. In a home
network, users might want to use time as the basis
for parental control. Operators normally rely on time-
triggered scripts to implement these policies, but they
are still low-level and error-prone.
• History. Operators sometimes specify policies whereby
the behavior of the network depends on history (i.e.,
past conditions or patterns in the network). Examples
of historical information include amount of data usage
(download/upload), data transfer rate over a particular
time interval, or load on a certain port.
• User. An operator may wish to specify privileges for
different users or groups of users. Moreover, user’s
privilege or status often changes due to various reasons.
Legacy configuration systems do attempt to distinguish
users through various methods, including VLAN tag,
MAC address, IP address, port numbers, or any combi-
nation of these fields.
• Flow. A network flow contains fields such as the
source/destination MAC address, source/destination IP
address, TCP/UDP port numbers, etc. Network opera-
tors want to specify different network behaviors based
time history user flow
policy domains output
Lithium
Figure 2: Conceptual representation of Lithium. Lithium
extends OpenFlow, which only uses the flow as a condition
for taking an action, by supporting additional domains to be

















Figure 3: High-level design of Lithium.
on various field values in multiple layers, specified in a
packet or flow.
Figure 2 shows the conceptual illustration of how Lithium
extends OpenFlow’s expressiveness, since OpenFlow sup-
ports actions based on flow properties only. We do not claim
that the set of domains that we have outlined is complete,
but we demonstrate in later sections that this set is expres-
sive enough to support a wide range of network policies in
various types of network deployments.
2.2 Designing Lithium
We now explain how we design Lithium to support the
four control domains. Figure 3 shows the high-level design
of Lithium. Lithium has two main components: (1) a finite
state machine, and (2) a dynamic event handler.
2.2.1 Finite state machine
Lithium uses a finite state machine model to express and
enforce network policies. Event-driven control domains es-
sentially invoke network events, which in turn can trigger
state transitions in the finite state machine. Incoming traf-
fic is subjected to different actions depending on the current
network state.
States. A state in Lithium’s control model maps to a partic-
ular network state that correspond to a set of static network
policies. A set of domain values represents a state. For ex-
ample, a state may be a certain time of day, the presence
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of a certain user on the network, the traffic that an applica-
tion has sent over the past day, or even some combination of
these types of values. In Lithium, each end-system device
is mapped to a single state, which is identified by its MAC
address. The state of a device at any time determines how
a network switch will forward its traffic. In this paper, we
assume an end host device can only be assigned to a single
state, for simplicity.
Events. Networks may experience a variety of events, rang-
ing from intrusions to changes in traffic volumes to the ar-
rival or departure of new hosts; the Lithium controller re-
sponds automatically to these events. We define an event as
any change in state (i.e., a change in time, history, user, or
flow). Any event can induce the controller to execute a dif-
ferent set of actions for a particular end host by updating flow
table entries. In summary, a change in a domain value (i.e.,
a state change) is an event that triggers an ultimate change
in the flow table entries of one or more network switches;
the network policy determines exactly how these flow-table
entries should change for different events.
2.2.2 Dynamic event handler
The Lithium dynamic event handler processes network
events that arrive at the controller. It waits for events on a
TCP socket and determines where incoming events are com-
ing from and whether they were sent by a known event dis-
patcher. If the handler recognizes an event’s source and mes-
sage type, it processes the event and executes a state transi-
tion for the associated device based on accompanying event
parameters. The event handler also manages flow table state
by deleting old flow table entries on switches, which will
cause the switches to receive the correct set of entries the
next time they query the controller.
Lithium reacts to domain events instead of proactively
fetching domain values. We do this for practicality: if the
controller proactively queried the network domain, then ev-
ery packet would need to visit the controller to determine
its action; this approach scales poorly in operational Open-
Flow networks because of flow setup overhead. Recent work
in declarative configuration languages suggest methods for
mitigating this scalability limitation [29].
3. Towards “High-Level” Configuration
Although Lithium presents a new programming model for
specifying network policies, operators still need a high-level
language for easily specifying these policies. Lithium does
not currently have a high-level language for expressing net-
work policies. The policy itself is embedded in the controller
as a program expressed in C++, which offers the convenience
of a widely used language but does not offer the potential
benefits of other high-level languages. This paper focuses
on designing the back-end framework that can more readily
support a high-level language. We envision a high-level lan-
guage with the following features:
• Declarative Reactivity: Operators should be able to de-
fine reactive device permissions in a declarative way,
by describing when events happen, what changes they
trigger, and how permissions change over time.
• Expressive and Compositional Operators: A powerful,
expressive set of language constructs should allow op-
erators to build reactive permissions out of smaller re-
active components.
• Well-defined Semantics: The language should have
simple semantics, simplifying policy specification
when compared with current methods of configuration.
In addition, the semantics should provide a basis for
building a variety of related tools, such as static analy-
sis tools for policy analysis prior to deployment.
• Error Checking & Conflict Resolution: Leverag-
ing well-defined, mathematical semantics, the language
should be able to automatically inspect its own config-
uration and detect errors or conflicting statements or
operational goals after reconfiguration attempts.
Embedded domain-specific languages (DSLs) allow network
operators to specify event-based policies at a higher level of
abstraction. Currently all domains in Lithium are represented
with a single datatype so Lithium’s policies are technically
not an embedded domain-specific language, but we are cur-
rently extending Lithium to provide support for embedded
DSLs. DSLs that facilitate functional reactive programming
(FRP) are a natural fit for event-driven programming models
like Lithium since they make it easy to specify programs that
operate on streams of events. Possible future work might in-
volve extending a DSL like Nettle [33, 37], Frenetic [17], or
NetCore [29] to express policies in Lithium at a higher level
than is currently possible with any of these languages.
4. Implementation
We now describe the implementation of Lithium and how
various components support policies that build on the do-
mains we outlined in Section 2.
4.1 Lithium Controller Overview
Our current implementation uses NOX [20] version 0.6.0,
which is compatible with OpenFlow version 1.0.0. The con-
troller manipulates the flow table entries for all connected
OpenFlow switches, as a conventional NOX controller does.
Through the predefined API in NOX, the controller adds,
deletes, and modifies flow table entries. As with a conven-
tional OpenFlow controller, the Lithium controller makes de-
cisions about distinct flows and enforces these decisions by
installing flow table entries in individual switches.
Figure 4 shows an overview of Lithium’s implementation.
As in conventional OpenFlow-based network, when a new
flow arrives, it is directed to the controller, at which point the


















Figure 4: How Lithium processes flows using the extended
set of domains from Section 2.
based on the flow’s MAC address. Each state, Si, has a de-
fault associated action, Ai, that determines the action that
a switch should take for that flow and state (e.g., forward,
drop). The controller’s event handler processes dynamic net-
work events invoked by internal or external modules. Based
on the identity of the event, the state to which the flow is
mapped to can change, thereby altering how switches in the
network process the flow.
The processing machinery for Lithium is written in C++.
Excluding the code to implement policy specifications, the
central controller is implemented with 1,266 lines of C++.
The ultimate size of the code running at the controller of
course depends on the network policy itself, since currently
the policy is programmed and encoded in the controller (also
in C++). As we explained in Section 3, a separate high-level
language for specifying policy could also be run in conjunc-
tion with the existing controller.
4.2 Event-Driven Control Domains
To support the three additional domains in addition to to
the flow domain that already exists in OpenFlow, Lithium
has several additional components that we describe below: a
user database, a history database, and a time module. Some
components can be implemented within the controller itself,
while some components, such as the history database, are
implemented as a separate piece of functionality.
User database. Lithium allows a user’s identity to be
mapped to network identifiers, as stated above. Lithium also
allows users or devices to be assigned to different policy
groups in a declarative way. Moreover, different network
events can change a user’s privilege level; for example, a
successfu login at a Web authentication portal could change
a user’s privilege level. These external events can update the
internal user DB shown in Figure 4. The runtime system
should allow different network policies to be applied to dif-
ferent users. For the case studies Section 5, we use MAC
address to distinguish between users and user devices.
History database. The history domain could conceivably be
used to express a wide range of values ranging from histori-
cal data usage for past five minutes to the average throughput
for a day. We have currently set up a history database es-
pecially for tracking the Internet usage of end-host devices,
differentiated by their MAC address. The database is up-
dated periodically with the new data usage information. Op-
erators can configure the history database so that it invokes
events when specified conditions are met: in our case study,
data usage of particular hosts reaching their capacity thresh-
old value. Based on the usage value as well as the capacity
set for the host device, forwarding policy for each device’s
traffic is determined. We demonstrate Lithium’s support for
historical queries in Section 5, in more detail.
Timing module. Lithium supports policies that use time of
day as a condition through a separate module. As in Figure 4,
Lithium has an internal time module which an incoming flow
uses to fetch the time at the moment the flow enters the con-
troller. A separate external time module could be used, as
well. The time module is often used in conjunction with the
history database many historical policies naturally incorpo-
rate time ranges (e.g., data usage over one gigabyte from 2 to
3 p.m.).
4.3 Processing External Events
As shown in Figure 4, Lithium contains a dynamic event
handler, which is responsible of processing external events
and signaling the internal finite state machine in turn to make
relevant changes to the underlying network. The event dis-
patcher sends a message to the central controller via a TCP
connection over port 9999. We have implemented a client
program in both C and Python; therefore, to send events to
the Lithium controller, the network entity must only run the
program we provide or generate a message that conforms to
the specification in Table 2.
The event message has two header fields: payload length
andmessage type; and three body parameters: sender ID, de-
vice ID, and event ID. Table 2 shows the format of an event
message packet. The header contains the total length of the
packet and the message type. In the body, sender ID is the
identification number of event sender or the dispatcher. The
controller uses this ID to determine the origin of the event;
the current implementation uses pre-defined numbers, but the
sender ID might also be the MAC address associated with the
device that generated the event. The device ID is the MAC
address of the host that may be affected as a result of the
event. The event ID specifies the type of event that has oc-
curred; the event handler uses the event ID, plus the host de-
vice’s current state, to determine the subsequent state for the
device.
If the event triggers a state transition, Lithium deletes ex-
isting flow table entries in all switches. This is to make sure
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payload length msg type sender ID device ID event ID
Table 2: Event message payload format.
new incoming packets do not match the outdated flow table
entries, because different states have different set of forward-
ing rules. Correct flow table entries will be populated on-
wards.
5. Real-World Deployments
In this section, we describe the deployment of Lithium in
two real-world scenarios where network configuration can be
difficult: enterprise networks and home networks. In Sec-
tion 5.1, we study how Lithium and our new configuration
model can be used to solve a common access control problem
that arises in computer networks, furthermore how to extend
and simplify the task; we describe the deployment of Lithium
in an operational campus network. In Section 5.2, we explain
how Lithium can be applied to home networks to make cer-
tain network management tasks easier, and to facilitate the
outsourcing of some aspects of home network management.
Each of the deployment scenarios below currently exer-
cises different domains that Lithium supports: Our campus
network deployment focuses on Lithium’s support for han-
dling different types of external events, while our home net-
work deployment focuses on Lithium’s support for time and
history. In practice, both of these scenarios could be extended
to use more domains to support a richer set of policies. In
addition to the policies that we have implemented in current
deployments, we describe how our current deployments can
be easily extended to support a richer set of policies.
5.1 Campus Network
We describe how we have deployed a network access con-
trol system within a single network using Lithium. The func-
tion of the system we have deployed mirrors and extends
an access control system in our campus network, which is
currently based on a complicated VLAN-based setup. The
Lithium state machine implements basic states that are asso-
ciated with network access control and were inspired by the
policies that the VLAN-based system implements. The re-
sulting deployment has several distinct advantages over the
existing deployment, which has several shortcomings: The
current framework is hard to manage, due to the distributed
configurations; it is too coarse-grained, due to the limited
number of VLAN groups defined; and it is too static, due to
the fact that it is difficult to remap clients from one VLAN to
another when various network events occur.
We begin by describing these policies; we then explain
how Lithium processes events from various other network
components, as well as how the system might be extended to
process other event streams. Finally, we describe the deploy-
















Figure 5: The legacy system architecture.
5.1.1 Current approach
Figure 5 shows the current access control system, which
we will call the legacy system for now on. The system is
based on VLAN technology and dynamic manipulation of
firewall rules. Network operators must enable VLAN func-
tions in all switches by adding VLAN assignment commands
to switch configuration files. Every port that has a connection
in a switch needs a set of VLAN commands. Although the
setup we describe is specific to our network, many campus
network operators we have talked to describe similar setups
and configurations on their campus networks. Essentially,
there is no “out of the box” solution to for implementing dy-
namic network access control.
The network has two separate VLAN groups: for regis-
tered users (reg-vlan) and the other for unregistered users
(unreg-vlan). There are also two DHCP servers, one for
each VLAN group. If an unknown device appears in the net-
work, it is assigned to the unreg-vlan VLAN group; known
devices stay in the reg-vlan group. Based on this VLAN as-
signment, a device’s DHCP lease request reaches a different
DHCP server and receives IP addresses for different address
ranges. The DNS server returns different DNS records based
on the host’s IP address. If request comes from the unreg-
istered group, all requests are resolved to the authentication
web portal, where the user must input credentials; registered
users’ DNS requests resolve to their designated destination.
The scanner is responsible for scanning the host devices for
known vulnerabilities when during the registration process.
Switches periodically download the VLAN group-host map-
ping from VLAN Management Policy Server, or VMPS [1]
so that they have the most updated mapping between hosts
and VLANs.
Access control lists in firewalls ensure that devices in the
unreg-vlan group are only allowed to connect to the authen-
tication Web portal through port 80 or 443; all other traffic
is blocked. Traffic from host devices in the reg-vlan group is
basically allowed with few exceptions due to security issues.
Specific source ports can be allowed, allowing host devices
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guest * * * allow






infected * * * block
Table 3: Policy for each state in campus
to host services like Web server, based on the options se-
lected when registering the device. This is done by inserting
additional firewall rules dynamically in the firewall device.
5.1.2 Lithium approach
We start by enumerating the actual required network poli-
cies currently enforced in the network by the legacy sys-
tem. Additionally, we add more useful policies that can be
achieved easily through Lithium, but far more harder to ac-
complish with the legacy system. Figure 3 summarizes the
network policy. Additional network policies achieved by
Lithium are shown in bold.
States. In this case study, we define four different network
states that that are represented by combinations of values in
the underlying network domains: Registration, Scanning, Al-
low, and Block. Hosts in the Registration state are unregis-
tered devices that have not yet authenticated via the authen-
tication Web portal. In this state, HTTP traffic is redirected
to the authentication Web portal; all other traffic is dropped.
Host devices in Scanning state are only allowed to interact
with the vulnerability scanner in the network, which checks
the host device for known vulnerabilities. All other traffic
will be dropped. The Allow state allows all traffic (subject to
normal operational firewall rules), and Block state blocks all
communication to the rest of the network. Peak guest blocks
guest traffic which hits the data usage limit of 1GB during
the peak hour 2–6 p.m. everyday. Although not the actions
are not shown in the table, both DHCP traffic and DNS traffic
are always allowed by default.
Events and transitions. After defining the states, an oper-
ator must specify the transitions between them, as well as
the events that trigger each transition. Figure 6 describes the
transitions and events for this operational deployment. The
host’s traffic behavior solely depends on its current policy
state. To ensure that switches forward traffic according to
policy, flow table entries that have the host’s MAC address
are deleted and re-populated in all connected switches when















Figure 6: Transitions and events in campus.
Event dispatch. Our deployment of Lithium in a campus
network has several types of devices and systems that send
events to the Lithium controller. We have deployed a set of
devices that could trigger state changes that alter a host’s ac-
cess rights; other types of network policies might take in-
put from different event dispatchers and require policies that
build on a different set of domains. Events are dispatched
according to the format presented in Section 4: Each event
is accompanied with a sender ID, which identifies the event
dispatcher; and event ID, which differentiates different events
from a single event dispatcher; and a device ID, which rep-
resents the host device that may change its state according to
the event.
• Authentication portal. This component authenticates
users who attempt to use to the network. Any HTTP re-
quest from an unauthenticated user is redirected to the
authentication portal, which requests the user’s login
credentials. Only when the user provides the correct
credentials (in this case, a combination of username
and password) does the authentication portal invoke the
notifier executable to send a notification to Lithium.
A successful authentication moves user’s device to the
Scanning state.
• Scanner. There are a variety of proprietary and free
scanners; our deployment uses a port scanner as a proof
of concept. We use nmap [36] to scan for open ports of
the host machine. However, any scanner would work
as long as it is able to dispatch events to the Lithium
controller. After the scanning is done, the scanner noti-
fies Lithium so that the host’s state can change to Block
(if vulnerabilities are found) or Allow (if host turns out
to be clean) based on the result and depending on the
group the scanned host belongs to.
• Intrusion detection system. Lithium uses Snort,
an open source network intrusion and detection sys-
tem [35]. The IDS inspects the payload of traversing
traffic and generates an alert if suspicious packets are
detected. This actually causes the state of the hosts to
change to Block state, as shown in Figure 6. As the re-
sult, traffic of the host is dropped. It is possible for the
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operator to revert back to the original state dynamically
without restarting the controller by sending an appro-
priate remedy notification to the dynamic listener.
• History database. We have built a separate history
database, which continuously tracks the data usage of
each host device in the network and stores it for future
use. A graphical user interface is available via a web
browser to set the limit, or cap, data usage value for
each device. If the actual data usage hits the limit value
in the specified block of time, (e.g., 2–6 p.m.), a trig-
ger invokes a dynamic event towards the controller to
enable the transition.
5.1.3 Deployment experience
Figure 7 shows the current deployment of system in the
our network. There are five OpenFlow-enabled switches (two
HP switches, two NEC switches, and one Toroki switch) de-
ployed across the campus, forming our system network that
spans three buildings. The NEC switch’s OpenFlow switch-
ing performance is 136 Gbps, 101.2 Mpps. The controller
runs on a Dell PowerEdge 1950 machine running Ubuntu
Linux 9.04 with 8 GB RAM and Intel Xeon Quad-core
2.5 GHz processors. It has 1 Gbps network interfaces at-
tached to it. Two access points are deployed around the lab
and hallway in building #3 to enable users to connect via a
wireless network. Two /27 IP subnets are reserved for the
Lithium network: one for management and the other for data
traffic; thus, the network is separate from the existing access
control network managed by the legacy system.
A user who is within range of the access points in the net-
work can connect to the Lithium network by establishing a
wireless connection to our predefined SSID with a shared
key. Immediately after successful connection establishment,
the DHCP server assigns the host a public address from the
IP pool we have reserved for the Lithium network. If the
controller has never previously seen the host’s MAC address
or the host has never been authenticated, the traffic will be
redirected to our authentication portal. The user must input
valid credentials to the portal so that the host machine’s state
can transfer from the Registration to Scanning state. At this
point, the vulnerability scanner initiates a scanning on the
host machine. If the host machine is considered to be clean,
the state will finally change to Allow.
The deployment was successful and reliable enough to be
used as a daily access point for many users, especially when
the pre-existing VLAN-based network access control system
experienced configuration or connectivity problems.
5.2 Home Network
Internet service providers around the world are beginning
to deploy monthly “usage caps”, which limit the amount
of traffic that any particular subscriber can transfer within
a billing cycle. For example, in the United States, Com-






























Figure 7: Campus network deployment.
and AT&T DSL and U-Verse users are subject to a 150-
gigabyte usage cap. Given the growing diversity of appli-
cations, the increasing demands of certain applications (e.g.,
high-definition NetFlix movies), and the relative opacity of
usage information to individual users [9], consumers need
better ways of managing these caps.
Unfortunately, intuitive tools for helping users monitor and
manage their usage caps effectively do not exist today. To
fill the need for such a tool, we are developing a system to
help consumers perform flexible and fine-grained monitor-
ing and management of their usage caps. Previous user stud-
ies have identified that consumers want information to help
them manage the usage cap to ensure all household mem-
bers enjoy good performance for their activities, while also
avoiding overage charges or service interruptions if the “cap”
is exceeded [9].
Lithium empowers unskilled home users to be semi-
operators in their own household, allowing them to perform
general resource management of data usage. Through our
system, home users can set usage caps or limits on each de-
vice, user and household and even facilitates other more so-
phisticated policies, such as parental control.
5.2.1 Current approach
Some ISPs provide a Web interface where a user can view
and monitor the aggregate usage at a household level, but we
are not aware of any management system that allows users to
specify any type of control, in addition to plain usage mon-
itoring, even though most existing home networking infras-
tructure supports such functions.
One possible approach is manual configuration of the
home router by a skilled home user. This will likely involve
manual manipulation of firewall-like rules in the home router
or modem, which is difficult to land a correct configuration,
even harder to maintain. Another approach is the ISP per-
forming host device level access control. However, this in-
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Table 4: Network policy for home network usage manage-
ment.
Allow Block






Figure 8: States and transitions for a simple example of us-
age cap management in home networks.
corporates dynamic manipulation of access control lists in
firewalls or routers managed by the ISP.
5.2.2 system approach
Assuming the ISP is willing to provide this service to
home users, we use Lithium to build a working solution.
States. Table 4 details the network policy for the home net-
work usage management system. This policy requires two
states states here: Allow and Block. Host devices in Block
state are not allowed to have internet connection while host
traffic in Allow state is all allowed without exception. Host
devices are assigned to the Allow state by default whenever a
new monthly cycle starts.
Events & transitions. There are two transitions in the home
deployment which are driven by two events: cap reached and
cap released. The transitions are shown in Figure 8. Cap
reached event is triggered when the data usage exceeds the
predefined cap value. The databased detects the situation and
raises an event to notify the central controller. This event
triggers a host to move to the Blockstate, i.e., Capped state,
thus blocking all traffic between the host and the Internet.
Cap released event is generated by the database if it detects
that the cap value is again over the actual data usage, or if the
capping functionality is disabled. The event makes the host’s
state change to Allow, i.e., Uncapped state where all traffic is
allowed.
Event dispatch. Lithium’s home network solution uses the
same history database used in Section 5.1. As described ear-
lier, the history database sends an event to the central con-
troller to invoke transitions between states. For this particu-

















Figure 9: Home network deployment.
Figure 9 how Lithium can be used for home data usage
management system. We use a NetGear WNDR 3700v2
gateway as the wireless home router, which runs a custom
made firmware based on OpenWrt. We use PostgreSQL as
the back end database and an Apache web server is set up to
provide a graphical interface for monitoring as well as man-
aging usage in the home network. Home users interact with
the graphical interface through a Web browser to view and
set usage caps on devices and users. When a cap is reached,
relevant devices will be cut off from the network and will be
informed by an automatically generated email.
We have deployed these wireless routers in two house-
holds and are planning a more extensive deployment in a
dozen households to support a broader user study on home
network management interfaces. More generally, the deploy-
ment shown in Figure 8 can allow for a variety of home net-
work management tasks to be “outsourced”. Several projects
have advocated slicing the home network infrastructure to
allow multiple service providers to use and control the home
network infrastructure simultaneously [38]; others have even
proposed outsourcing some aspects of network control en-
tirely to third parties [13]. This deployment of Lithium could
easily support such a broader range of management tasks and
scenarios.
6. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the usability and feasibility of
Lithium. Evaluation of network management systems is dif-
ficult since there are no quantitative metrics that allow us to
compare Lithium to existing approaches. The state of the art
in complexity evaluation is syntactic: the methods only apply
to networks where one can analyze the syntax of low-level
network configurations [5, 27]. Because Lithium takes an
new approach to configuration that does not rely on low-level
configuration, these approaches do not apply. We concede
that there is definitely a need for more comprehensive met-
rics for measuring the complexity of various network man-
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agement systems. Given that no such framework exists, we
focus our evaluation on two aspects:
• Usability (Section 6.1). We perform a qualitative eval-
uation of how Lithium can make network management
tasks easier for network operators and users. Our aim
is to argue informally that Lithium is more manageable
than existing network configuration frameworks.
• Feasibility (Section 6.2). We perform a quantitative
evaluation to demonstrate that the performance over-
head imposed by Lithium is negligible compared to ex-
isting OpenFlow-based systems with published perfor-
mance numbers (such as the deployment in the Gates
building at Stanford University).
6.1 Qualitative Evaluation: Usability
Measuring whether a certain network management or con-
figuration system is more effective or usable than existing so-
lutions is difficult, due to the lack of standard usability met-
rics. Here, we discuss several criteria that can possibly re-
flect the usability of a management system. We do not claim
that Lithium can achieve networking tasks that operators can-
not in some way perform with legacy methods today. In
fact, with the variety of configuration commands used in net-
work devices combined with additional customized scripts
and tools, legacy systems are remarkably flexible and capa-
ble. Rather than focus on what is possible (capability), we
focus on the ease of solving certain problems (usability).
More expressive with fewer touches, fewer scripts. When
configuring and managing a network, fewer touches to net-
work configuration may reduce configuration errors and
overall workload for network operators. For example, con-
sider adding or deleting a VLAN group in the previous cam-
pus access control case study through legacy methods. Es-
sentially, operators have to touch multiple switches that are
responsible of forwarding traffic for the group. In each
switch, ports that are related to that VLAN group should
be configured in detail. In Lithium, the same task can be
achieved by adding a new policy state in the controller if
necessary without touching other network devices, and ad-
ditional scripts are not required as well.
Fewer distinct scripts are desirable as well because they
become harder to manage and maintain as the number grows.
Lithium maintains to be very expressing, leveraging the
event-driven control domains while refraining from using
separate scripts to do the job.
More general. Lithium is general enough to solve a variety
of network management tasks. The case studies in the pre-
vious section demonstrate this generality. Legacy configura-
tion techniques would require two different approaches for
each task; campus network access control requires VLAN
configuration, and the home network management case re-
quires a separate script is required to update iptable rules in
the local wireless router.
More portable. In legacy configuration methods, policy is
enforced by configuring individual devices in the network,
so applying an identical or even similar network policy to
another network with different physical infrastructure may
be cumbersome. Because network policy depends on on
individual configuration files from network devices, config-
urations may be specific to network topology, switch ven-
dors and software versions, and other specifics of a particular
network. In Lithium, policies might be more easily ported,
since the control program could be written in a more device-
independent manner.
6.2 Quantitative Evaluation: Feasibility
As the size of network grows, the key factors that affect
the feasibility of Lithium are (1) forwarding performance;
(2) the size of the flow table in switches; and (3) the load on
controller and switches. However, as OpenFlow is used for
materializing Lithium, the performance and feasibility also
heavily relies on OpenFlow’s capability. Although this pa-
per’s main focus is about presenting a better network control
model, we do performed some basic quantitative evaluation
to prove two main points: First, it is indeed feasible to run
Lithium on real operational networks, e.g., campus or home;
Second, Lithium does not incur additional processing over-
head compared to the basic NOX controller.
6.2.1 Forwarding performance & latency
We first evaluate the throughput and latency of Lithium
for both case studies from Section 5. We emulate synthetic
traffic with netperf [34]. For throughputmeasurement, we
send a stream of TCP packets between two hosts for at least
120 seconds until it achieves a confidence level of 95%. For
latency, we measure the round trip time, or RTT, between two
hosts, collecting around 500 round trip time measurements.
Campus network measurements. In our campus access
control case study, presented in Section 5.1, we use pro-
duction quality OpenFlow-enabled switches from profes-
sional network switch vendors, NEC, HP, and Toroki. These
switches implement OpenFlow as a kernel module and per-
forms packet forwarding and flow matching in the hardware.
Measurement testbed is set up as following: Two end hosts
are directly connected to one NEC switch, and the controller
is one-hop away from the NEC switch.
Table 5 shows the throughput and latency measurements
in the campus network between three systems on synthetic
traffic: (1) baseline (without system or NOX), (2) with NOX
switch implementation, and (3) with Lithium. The baseline is
when only basic VLAN configuration is used to connect the
two end hosts, and we assume the performance of baseline is
same as the existing configuration without OpenFlow. NOX
switch is an existing implementation which comes with the
NOX suite, and simply makes OpenFlow switches to forward
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every packet it receives to the correct output port based on the
destination MAC address. The comparison shows negligible
performance difference between baseline, NOX switch im-
plementation, and Lithium for both throughput and latency.
The table also suggests that Lithium does not introduce ad-
ditional delay for policy lookup when compared to the NOX
switch implementation.1
Home network measurements. Table 6 shows the measure-
ment results in the home network (wired and wireless) be-
tween three systems on synthetic traffic. The use of the NOX
switch significantly hinders performance because the Open-
Flow module for OpenWrt is currently written in user space;
there is negligible difference between the NOX switch im-
plementation and Lithium.
Further investigation revealed that the home gateway is the
bottleneck cause for the performance degradation in the case
of home network. The NetGear WNDR 3700v2 gateway we
use has a 680 MHz MIPS 32-bit processor, and running an
OpenFlow module causes the CPU cycle to hit close to 90%
constantly during the test. This overhead is caused by the fact
that OpenFlow instances runs in the user-space instead of as
a kernel module in the gateway. More optimization itera-
tions can boost the performance further, but is limited. Open
vSwitch [2] is a production quality virtual switch, which can
be installed in linux-based wireless routers (e.g., OpenWrt).
Open vSwitch has OpenFlow as a built-in kernel module,
hence, we expect the performance to be comparable to the
baseline.
We expect that if the OpenFlow module were imple-
mented in the OpenWrt kernel, then both the NOX switch
and Lithium setups would forward trafficmuchmore quickly.
This trend is apparent in the latency measurement as well.
These results show that, while enabling tue current Open-
Flow module for traffic forwarding in OpenWrt significantly
slows forwarding performance, Lithium itself does not in-
cur additional performance degradation compared to the base
NOX implementation, despite the additional modules and
network policies embedded in Lithium.
6.2.2 Flow table size
Next, we study the scalability of Lithium in terms of flow
table size. There is a limit on the number of flow table en-
tries a single switch can maintain: 131,072 for exact match
entries and 100 for wildcard entries, according to the Open-
Flow specification [31]. An exact-match entry has all 12-
tuples specified with some value, while a wildcard entry con-
tains one or more tuples as wildcards.
To help us understand how Lithium might scale on larger
networks and in a home network, we performed a trace-based
analysis using data from a large campus network, and a typ-
1NOX has sometimes performed worse than Lithium; we suspected
that the default wildcard entries we insert into Lithium might be re-
sponsible for improved performance. We added the wildcard entries
in NOX and saw a performance improvement.
ical home network, as shown in Figure 10. For the campus
network, we captured an hour of traffic at the campus net-
work gateway on a typical weekday from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m.
For the home network, we captured an hour of traffic on the
home gateway router between 9 p.m to 10 p.m. We analyzed
these traces to infer the number of unique flows in specific
time intervals. With this information, we measure how many
flow-table entries are needed to manage the traffic.
In the campus network, as shown in Figure 10a, the num-
ber of flows is always below 25,000 along the measured
period, which is far below the 131,072 threshold for exact
match entries. Thus, in a typical campus network, Lithium
will likely scale in terms of flow table entries that each switch
must store. Moreover, it is likely that more than a single
switch would be responsible to handle a /16 subnet, thus con-
sidering these flows will be spread out to multiple switches,
Lithium is scalable in terms of flow table size. Figure 10b
also suggests the number of flow table entries needed for a
typical home network traffic would not exceed the limit.
Additional way to mitigate the growth of flow table en-
tries is to use wildcard entries. It is possible to dramatically
reduce the amount of communication between the controller
and switches by using several wildcard entries wisely. For
example, Figure 10 shows that DNS packets are responsible
for much of real production traffic. ARP packets and DHCP
packets will account for a notable portion of the traffic as
well, though not depicted in our figure.
6.2.3 Scalability: Load on controller and switches
The process of installing flow table entries in switches by a
central controller affects the scalability of both the controller
and switch. Basically, if a packet arrives at a switch and can-
not find a matching flow table entry, the switch buffers that
packet and consults the central controller, where the network
policy is stored. Then, the controller sends the decision to
the switch, and after a flow table entry is inserted, the packet
is processed based on that entry.
This overhead, which is commonly known as flow setup
overhead, is inherent to the current design of OpenFlow and
the NOX controller. This control plane interaction not only
incurs additional delay in packet forwarding, but also in-
creases the load on the controller as well as switches as they
sacrifice certain amount of CPU cycles and memory to per-
form the task. In other words, poor network topology and
system design can lead to overwhelming new flow setup re-
quests, overloading the switch and/or the central controller.
In fact, in our lab test, continuous stream of 2,000
unique flows was able to overwhelm the production quality
OpenFlow-enabled switch we have in several seconds, after
hitting 95-100% CPU utilization. Figure 11 shows the pro-
cessing time of the Lithium controller with different traffic
loads. Processing time is defined as the time the controller
uses to process a new flow request and send out a decision
to the switch, after the request arrives at the controller. The
number of unique flows, and, thus, the number of requests ar-
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System Throughput (Mbps) Latency (RTT avg.) Latency (RTT 95th %)
Baseline 941.34 0.1248 0.1258
NOX 940.14 0.1215 0.1246
Lithium 939.94 0.1239 0.1250
Table 5: Performance comparison in campus network. Baseline is the system without OpenFlow enabled. NOX represents a
system with OpenFlow running controlled by the basic NOX switch implementation. Lithium is our own controller implemen-
tation with the finite state machine and dynamic event handler module.
System
Throughput (Mbps) Latency (RTT avg.) Latency (RTT 95th %)
wired wireless wired wireless wired wireless
Baseline 93.76 35.16 1.739 2.584 1.779 2.903
NOX 21.13 16.29 2.309 3.323 2.428 3.976
Lithium 22.52 16.93 2.327 3.317 2.427 3.872
Table 6: Performance comparison in home network. System definition is same as Table 5.
Figure 11: Processing time difference at the controller with
different traffic load. Light traffic is a continuous TCP stream
traffic with 500 unique flows. Medium traffic identical but
with 1,000 unique flows, and heavy traffic with 1,500 unique
flows.
riving at the controller, clearly affect the performance of the
central controller.
Our test results suggest that the number of interactions be-
tween the controller and switches in the control plane is the
key factor that determines the scalability of Lithium. Fortu-
nately, several recent studies tackle this overhead issue us-
ing clever techniques. For example, DIFANE suggests to
lessen the controller load by deploying authority switches
that cache authority rules and respond to normal switch’s re-
quests instead of the central controller [39]. DevoFlow uses
several techniques simultaneously, (e.g., rule-cloning, mini-
mizing statistic requests), to minimize the control plane in-
teraction [10]. Continuous advancement in improving the
scalability of OpenFlow, or software defined networking in
general, can help foster and enable the deployment of many
network control systems that rely on or assume logically cen-
tralized control, such as Lithium.
7. Related Work
In this section, we survey previous work on software de-
fined networking, languages for programming Openflow net-
works, and other network management frameworks.
The field of software defined networking (SDN) has roots
in Ethane [6], RCP [15], and 4D [19]. The 4D architecture
generally describes the separation of the control and data
planes. Ethane embodies this architecture; it introduced a
newmethod for configuring and managing a network through
central command with a software software program that pop-
ulates flow-table entries in network switches. Ethane’s policy
model and its policy language, POL-ETH, only allow lim-
ited configuration of static policies. Lithium complements
Ethane’s work by introducing a new policy model with a
right abstraction, an attempt to reduce network complexity
and ease the process of network configuration and making
changes to it. The OpenFlow protocol standard is currently
the lingua franca of software-defined networking [28, 32],
and it is the standard on which Lithium builds. While Open-
Flow is often used synonymously with software-defined net-
works, we note that the protocol standard is just one instanti-
ation of software defined networking. Richer control frame-
works such as Lithium also fall within the broader paradigm
of SDN. In an early workshop paper, Nayak et al. proposed
an SDN-control framework that processes certain network
events for access control systems [30]; Lithium extends the
design of that system to incorporate a much broader set of
control domains. We also present a complete implementa-
tion and deployment of such a system.
There has been significant recent attention into developing
languages for programming OpenFlow networks. FML [21]
is a policy language for NOX that allows network opera-
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(b) Number of flows in home network
Figure 10: Number of unique flows in (a) a /16 subnet from a large campus network, and (b) a home network. Time periods
are selected based on the peak usage hours on a typcial weekday.
tors to write and maintain policies efficiently in a declara-
tive manner. Frenetic is a domain specific language for pro-
gramming OpenFlow networks that provides programmers
an abstraction of seeing every packet, even though the pro-
gram is operating from a central controller [17, 18]. Nettle
is a domain specific language implemented in Haskell that
is used to configure BGP policies with more comprehen-
sive abstraction calculation constructs [33,37]. Both Frenetic
and Nettle use functional reactive programming, a declara-
tive programming paradigm that allows programmers to ex-
press event processing very naturally; in principle, Lithium
could serve as the underlying control system for either lan-
guage. Frenetic’s programming model is at a packet-level
granularity, so it might be too low-level for the types of poli-
cies that we aim to implement with Lithium. NetCore is a
declarative language for expressing packet forwarding pol-
icy on SDNs which improves the performance of Frenetic’s
see-every-packet abstraction by automating and optimizing
the installation of flow table entries [29]. Nettle’s and Net-
Core’s focus on higher-level policies may make them more
appropriate languages to run on top of Lithium.
Researchers have proposed various management frame-
works and systems to make network configuration easier and
less error-prone; none of these previous systems have used
software defined networking as a platform for doing so. Bal-
lani et al., identified the problem of low-level configuration
language used in network devices, and built CONMan, which
uses higher-level modular building blocks to achieve same
functions [4]. PACMAN [8] and COOLAID [7] by Chen
et al., both implement a higher-level construct than device-
specified configuration languages to achieve certain network-
ing tasks. However, the above studies focus on building
a language that ultimately translates into low-level device-
specified commands, while Lithium advocates a new con-
figuration model as a stand-alone, event-driven program that
captures the dynamics of a network well.
8. Conclusion
Configuring networks is difficult and error-prone, and op-
erators must configure individual network devices using low-
level, vendor-specific configuration commands. Ensuring
that these devices achieve some higher level network-wide
property is difficult, and certain types of policies cannot be
expressed at all. Although the networking community has
long agreed that networks need better network configura-
tion languages, most network configuration languages re-
main low-level and are unable to allow operators to express
high-level events and policies. We believe that enabling con-
figuration languages that allow the expression of higher-level
policies first requires a network control model that can pro-
cess higher-level events in the first place. Towards this goal,
we have designed, implemented, and evaluated Lithium, an
event-driven network control framework that can implement
policies based on four different domains: time, user, history,
and traffic flow. To demonstrate the power and flexibility
of these domains for expressing higher-level network poli-
cies, as well as the ability of Lithium to implement them,
we deployed Lithium in two different network settings—a
campus network and a home network. Our evaluations show
that Lithium introduces negligible overhead beyond a con-
ventional OpenFlow-based network.
Significant work remains in developing higher-level con-
figuration languages for networks, and we believe that
Lithium can potentially enable this next step by providing
an event-based control framework that could act as a runtime
for event-based network configuration languages. The ad-
vent of software-defined networking also potentially enables
a wide range of network control frameworks that support an
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even broader range of domains than the ones that we have ex-
plored in this paper. In this sense, Lithium serves only as the
first step towards exploring how software defined networking
can help simplify network configuration and management.
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